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Abstract
We investigate the importance of employing a valid model for monetary policy analysis.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate the economic signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in speciﬁcation and empir-
ical validity of models. We consider three alternative econometric models of wage and price
inﬂation in Norway. We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in model speciﬁcation as well as in parameter
estimates across models can lead to widely diﬀerent policy recommendations. We also ﬁnd
that the potential loss from basing monetary policy on a model that may be invalid, or on a
suite of models, even when it contains the valid model, can be substantial, also when gradual-
ism is exercised as a concession to model uncertainty. Furthermore, possible losses from such
a practice appear to be greater than possible losses from failing to choose the optimal policy
horizon to a shock within the framework of a valid model. Our results substantiate the view
that a model for policy analysis should necessarily be empirically valid and caution against
compromising this property for other desirable model properties, including robustness.
Keywords: Model uncertainty; Econometric modelling; Economic signiﬁcance; Robust monetary
policy.
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11 Introduction
Model dependence of monetary policy analysis is well known, as is the multiplicity of models.
Several criteria can be used when choosing among models. Common criteria for choosing among
models include consistency with some economic theory and data. In addition, one may evaluate
models on the basis of how easily they would enable one to communicate their mechanisms and
functioning to a wider community, including users of models within the model-developing institu-
tion. Accordingly, one may use criteria such as the wider community’s familiarity with a model,
its similarity with models already in use, and its transparency. Parsimony of a model is another
sought-after property, as it enhances a model’s transparency and facilitates its updating.
One may also select a model because its policy implications seem robust to diﬀerent forms of
potential model misspeciﬁcations. The literature on robust monetary policy addresses the issue
of model choice and policy design when several models are available, and when a model may
potentially fail to adequately represent features of an economy. The strategy advised depends on
the extent of missing information about the appropriate model and its features.
The main approach to dealing with severe model uncertainty, when e.g. making a probability
distribution on relevant models and/or their features is considered too bold, is the minmax ap-
proach proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2001). Accordingly, the policy choice should be informed
by the least fault-tolerant model, i.e. the model in which a deviation from the optimal policy
has the most severe consequences. When it is appropriate to limit the model or parameter space
and specify probability distributions on its elements, the Bayesian approach is advocated; see e.g.
Levin and Williams (2003). Accordingly, the preferred policy depends on a deﬁned space of models
or parameters.
Model selection often involves a trade-oﬀ between desirable characteristics of a model since a
model may perform well on one set of criteria and poorly on another set. An economic theory
may prefer a diﬀerent model than available evidence suggests, while diﬀerent statistical tests may
favour diﬀerent models; cf. Pagan (2003). One may also encounter cases where a model that is
overwhelmingly supported by available evidence is more demanding to understand and/or com-
municate than a model that is not fully data-consistent. In such cases, one might decide to base
policies on the latter model. One may also support such an approach by arguing that data are
often measured with errors and are revised substantially over time. Furthermore, in the face of
model and data uncertainty, one may opt for the apparently most robust model, even though its
validity is empirically questionable. Alternatively, one may refrain from selecting one model and
decide to base policy on a suite of models consistent with e.g. the Bayesian approach.
However, Granger (1992, 2001) emphasize that consequences of one’s decision regarding model
choice for policy analysis should be evaluated in terms of their economic signiﬁcance. Accordingly,
2possible loss from choosing one model speciﬁcation ahead of another should not be assessed in
terms of only e.g. predictive power forsaken, or in terms of other desirable statistical properties,
but also in terms of potential economic/welfare loss. We essentially follows the recommendations
of Granger in this paper.
We investigate empirically whether it would matter much for economic performance and policy
implications which model is chosen, i.e. which set of criteria is used to select a model. Moreover,
we investigate the potential costs of basing monetary policy (unknowingly) on an invalid model or
a suite of models, for whatever good reasons. In particular, we shed light on the potential losses
from implementing robust policies based on a single robust model and a suite of models. In this
context, we also investigate to what extent one can mitigate the potential losses from choosing
an invalid model by following the Brainard principle for policy making in the face of uncertainty;
see Brainard (1967) for details. This principle often seems to guide monetary policy practice.
In its popular version, one should ﬁnd out how much interest rates need to be changed in given
circumstances and then do less as a concession to diﬀerent forms of uncertainty. Widely observed
gradualism in interest rate setting is often considered a reﬂection of the Brainard principle; see e.g.
Sack and Wieland (2000), Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) and the references therein.
We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in model speciﬁcation and even diﬀerences in estimates of key pa-
rameters across similar models may suggest widely diﬀerent economic performance and policy
implications in the face of shocks. Hence, we ﬁnd substantial losses from choosing a model other
than the one that represents the economy, or imposing invalid parameter restrictions. We also ﬁnd
that robust policies need not contribute much to reducing such losses, also when policy is based on
a suite of models containing the valid model, or when a policy is guided by the Brainard principle.
Furthermore, the potential loss from basing policy on an invalid model or a suite of models appear
to be larger than losses from conducting suboptimal policies based on the valid model.
Hence, there seem to be large gains from eﬃciently exploiting available information to derive
the appropriate model for policy analysis. The substantial losses from selecting an invalid model
suggest that a model used for monetary policy analysis should necessarily be empirically valid and
calls for caution when compromising this property for other desirable model properties, including
robustness. A comprehensive econometric evaluation of competing models of relevance for policy
analysis may help one to narrow down the choice to the most data-coherent model, given available
information.
We proceed as follows. The next section presents three alternative econometric systems of
wage and price inﬂation for Norway. They may be considered alternative blocks of the supply
side in a macroeconometric model for medium-term analysis. One of the systems is derived in the
light of open economy models of imperfect competition in product markets and a wage-bargaining
framework. The other two systems consist of Phillips curves for prices and wages, where one of
3them speciﬁes vertical Phillips curves for wage and price inﬂation through parameter restrictions.
The apparently small diﬀerences between the two systems of Phillips curves are especially useful in
demonstrating the model dependency of monetary policy rules. This section undertakes an econo-
metric evaluation of the three systems to examine their congruence with data and demonstrates
that available data are helpful in choosing among them.
Section 3 investigates the monetary policy implications of the three systems in the face of
demand and supply shocks. We assume that the central bank primarily targets the inﬂation rate
but, without prejudice to this objective, also pursues output stability. The latter objective is
pursued by choosing an appropriate horizon for achieving the inﬂation target. Previous studies
assuming an hierarchy of monetary policy objectives include Smets (2003) and Driﬃll and Zeno
(2004). This way of characterizing monetary policy seems consistent with the actual practice of
leading central banks; see e.g. Meyer (2004), Heikensten (2005) and Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006).1
In order to implement this approach, we follow the procedure suggested by Akram (2006) which
is brieﬂy outlined in Section 3.1.
Section 4 investigates the potential costs of basing monetary policy on an invalid model, or a
suite of models. We conduct the analysis by embedding, in turn, the three wage and price systems
representing the supply side in a well documented macroeconometric model of Norway; see B˚ ardsen
et al. (2003, 2005) and Akram et al. (2006). This model is part of the suite of models maintained by
Norges Bank. A number of researchers have called for monetary policy analysis using models that
are actually used in policy making institutions rather than simpliﬁed models used for illustrations;
cf. Goodhart (2001). Our use of the macroeconometric model is motivated by this call.
Section 5 presents our main conclusions while an appendix contains precise deﬁnitions of the
time series of the variables.
2 Alternative systems of prices and wages
This section develops and evaluates three alternative empirical systems of Norwegian wage and
price inﬂation. The three systems are derived from a common VAR model by imposing restrictions
in the light of relevant economic theories and following a ”general to speciﬁc” modelling strategy.2
1For the ECB “The Treaty establishes a clear hierarchy of objectives for the Eurosystem. It assigns overriding
importance to price stability.”, which is deﬁned as “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.” and “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability” support
the achievement of e.g. “high level of employment” and “sustainable and non-inﬂationary growth”; see www.ecb.int.
The Bank of England 1998 Act also expresses an hierarchical ordering between similar objectives; see
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/legislation/1998act.pdf.
2A Pc-Give batch ﬁle and a data ﬁle that can be used to replicate the results in detail can be downloaded from
http://folk.uio.no/rnymoen/.
42.1 Time series of key variables
The models are based on quarterly time series for the mainland economy of Norway, i.e. exclusive
of its oﬀshore sector. They are estimated on a data set that covers the period 1972q4-2001q4. The
data are seasonally non-adjusted and the time series are deﬁned more precisely in the appendix.
The variables of main interest to us include natural logs of average hourly wages (w), the
consumer price index (p), productivity (pr), an import price index (pb) and the unemployment
rate (u). In addition, payroll and indirect tax rates, τ1 and τ3, log of standard working hours (h)
and an index of electricity prices (pe) appear as explanatory variables in the systems of wages and
prices.
2.2 System of error correction models (ECMs)
The following long-run relationships for wages and prices in Norway are consistent with open
economy models of imperfect competition in product markets and a wage-bargaining framework:
wt = pt + γw1prt − γw2ut + γw0 + εw,t, (1)
pt = γp1(wt + τ1t − prt) + (1 − γp1)pbt + γp2τ3t + γp0 + εp,t, (2)
where the slope coeﬃcients are non-negative and γw0 and γp0 are intercepts. A detailed rational-
ization is given in B˚ ardsen et al. (2005, Ch 5) based on the assumption that wt, pt, prt and pbt are
variables that are integrated of degree one, but cointegrated. The tax and unemployment rates
are assumed to be without unit roots, while they may display deterministic non-stationarity due
to shifts in their mean rate over time; i.e. discrete tax rate changes in the case of τ3t. Therefore,
εw,t and εp,t represent stationary deviations from the two long-run relationships. B˚ ardsen et al.
(2003) show that (1) and (2) represent identiﬁed cointegrating relationships.3
Equation (1) is interpreted as a steady-state wage equation, which is implied by a bargaining
framework where wages are determined by domestic prices and productivity, while the rate of
unemployment aﬀects the mean level of the implied wage share: wt − pt − prt. Equation (2) is
interpreted as a steady-state price equation which incorporates both the eﬀects of mark-up pricing
behaviour (captured by the elasticity γp1), and a separate long-run elasticity of (1−γp1) for import
prices. Since the price variable pt is the consumer price index, it is also aﬀected by a measure of
indirect taxes, τ3.
We ﬁnd support for the following estimates of the long-run elasticities: γw1 = 1, γw2 = 0.15,
γp1 = 0.6 and γp2 = 0.5. The estimates of the intercept terms, γw0 and γp0, are close to the sample
means of the cointegrating relationships deﬁned by the elasticity estimates. These estimates are
consistent with those found in a number of previous studies using data samples of diﬀerent lengths,
3See the section on cointegration analysis in the provided PcGive batch ﬁle for documentation.
5periods and level of aggregation; see e.g. Nymoen (1991), Johansen (1995), B˚ ardsen et al. (1998),
B˚ ardsen and Nymoen (2003), B˚ ardsen et al. (2003), B˚ ardsen et al. (2005, Ch 9) and Boug et al.
(2002, Ch 5).
We derive a system of structural error correction models of wages and prices, (3), to represent
wage-price dynamics consistent with (1) and (2) being long-run cointegrating relationships. Here,
we also condition on a number of explanatory variables that have been found relevant in earlier
econometric models of Norwegian inﬂation. These variables are: changes in standard working
hours, ∆ht, which capture wage compensation for reductions in the length of the working day; see
Nymoen (1989). Second, the rate of change in aggregate demand, ∆yt, is included to represent
short-term inﬂationary pressure in the product markets directly. Third, the rate of change in
electricity prices, ∆pet, is an important exogenous explanatory variable for cpi-inﬂation (due to
Norway’s hydroelectric-based energy system). Fourth, given that incomes policies and direct price
regulations have been in operation on several occasions in the sample period, we control for their
eﬀects on wages and prices by employing the dummy variables Wd,t and Pd.t, respectively.4 Finally,
the system includes three seasonal dummies and intercept terms for the two structural equations
of the system. We employ the FIML method to estimate the system.5
∆wt = −0.11
(0.01)
































The equation for wages in system (3) shows that nominal quarterly wage growth, ∆wt, equilib-
rium corrects with respect to deviations from the steady-state relationship in (1).6 The ‘t-value’
associated with the equilibrium correction coeﬃcient is −11, suggesting that one of the main im-
4The speciﬁcation of Wdum and Pdum is given in the appendix together with the deﬁnition and sources of
the other variables. In addition, we refer to the downloadable PcGive batch and data for automatic and full
documentation.
5The seasonal dummies and intercepts are suppressed from the equation, while coeﬃcient standard errors are
given below their respective coeﬃcients.
6The 3-quarter lag in wages and the 2-quarter lag in unemployment only aﬀect how the dynamics is parameterized,
not the interpretation of [wt−3 − pt−1 − prt−1 + 0.1ut−2], which is an equilibrium correction term consistent with
(1). The detailed lag-speciﬁcation of the variables that make up the equilibrium correction term is a feature of the
dynamic speciﬁcation process which is helpful in achieving parameter parsimony. It does not aﬀect their economic
interpretation.
6plications of the underlying theoretical framework is strongly supported by the evidence. The
remainder of the equation ﬁrst shows that there is a tendency of negative autocorrelation in the
quarterly wage growth rate which is mainly because most wages are adjusted in the second and
third quarters. The last part of the wage equation contains eﬀects of imported inﬂation (∆pbt)
and wage compensation for changes in standard working hours (∆ht).
The price equation in system (3) shows that also the hypothesized price equilibrium correction
is supported by the data; the estimate of the equilibrium correction coeﬃcient has a ’−t-value’
of 6. The other variables also have straightforward interpretations: There is a statistically signif-
icant positive autoregressive coeﬃcient consistent with commonly observed inﬂation persistence.
Actually, the autoregressive coeﬃcient would have been larger without the inclusion of the other
explanatory variables in the model. Wage growth has a strong eﬀect with an elasticity of 0.34 over
two quarters. There is also a small positive eﬀect of product demand growth if sustained over two
quarters. The short-run eﬀects of productivity and import prices, though statistically signiﬁcant,
are quite small when compared with the corresponding long-run elasticities in the equilibrium
correction term. In contrast, the estimated elasticity of electricity prices (∆pet) is numerically
signiﬁcant, since they ﬂuctuate widely; ∆pet varies in the range of ±25%.
2.3 Systems of Phillips curves
We derive the two systems of Phillips curves from the same information set and VAR model as the
system of error correction models (ECMs). Speciﬁcally, they originate from the same unrestricted
reduced form, which corresponds to a VAR in levels with cointegration restrictions imposed.



































This system is consistent with an open-economy triangular model of inﬂation, whereby inﬂation
is determined by demand-pull, cost-push and expectations inherent in the wage-price spiral; see
e.g. Calmfors (1977), Gordon (1997), Stock and Watson (1999) and B˚ ardsen et al. (2002). The
long-run Phillips curve implied by this system is downward sloping, however, since the equation
has been found to be not homogenous in the price and wage inﬂation terms. In the short run,
7eﬀects of contemporaneous inﬂation (∆pt) appear in the wage equation, and of lagged inﬂation
(∆pt−2) in the price equation. This is in contrast to the system of wage-price ECMs, (3), but not
unexpected since inﬂation (and its lagged value) is correlated with both of the two equilibrium
correction terms in (3), which by the deﬁnition of Phillips curves are omitted from the current
system.



































This system has been obtained by imposing homogeneity restrictions on the combined eﬀects of
wages and prices in both of the equations in system (4).
A notable diﬀerence between system (4) and system (5) is that the coeﬃcient estimate of ut−1
is much lower in the latter.7 The price equation in (5), however, does not diﬀer much from that
in (4). This suggests that the homogeneity restrictions of the long-run Phillips curve model are
largely data-consistent, especially in the price equation.
2.4 Evidence-based model selection
In the following, we examine the econometric properties of the three systems and demonstrate that
available evidence is helpful in choosing among the three systems.
The overall explanatory power of all of the models is fairly high and does not seem to diﬀer
much across models. In particular, both the systems of Phillips curves, (4) and (5), provide nearly
the same level of ﬁt to actual wage and price growth over the sample period; see Figure 1.
More precisely, Table 1 shows that the overall explanatory power, as measured by the standard
deviations of the equation residuals, which are denoted ˆ σ∆w and ˆ σ∆p, is less than 1 percent for
(growth in) wages and less than 0.5 per cent for prices. This may be reckoned as quite satisfactory
since the data are seasonally unadjusted. The explanatory power of the three systems, especially
that of the systems of Phillips curves, is lower than that of the unrestricted VAR. For wages, the
system with the vertical Phillips curve, (5), has lower explanatory power than the system with
7One can set this estimate at some preferred value and re-estimate the model. However, the econometric perfor-
mance of the resulting model becomes inferior to that of system (5).
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Figure 1: Explanatory power of the three systems (3)–(5) for (quarterly) growth in wages and prices
over the sample period: 1972q4–2001q4. The left-hand column presents the explanatory power of
the three systems for growth in wages (∆w), while the right-hand column presents that for growth in
prices. Dashed lines with circles represent actual values of growth in wages, while dashed lines with
boxes represent the actual growth in prices. Solid lines represent the corresponding ﬁtted values.
the downward-sloping Phillips curve, (4), and the system of wage-price ECMs, (3). For prices,
however, both systems of Phillips curves provide the same explanatory power, but lower than the
ECM of prices.
Table 1: Explanatory power of the VAR and the three systems
System VAR (3) (4) (5)
ˆ σ∆w 0.85% 0.88% 0.93% 0.98%
ˆ σ∆p 0.33% 0.36% 0.47% 0.46%
Notes: The three systems have been estimated by FIML on a sample for the period
1973q1–2001q4. The VAR column shows the diagnostics of the statistical model
which has the three economic models/systems as special cases.
Yet, given the relatively high explanatory power of all three models, there may not seem to
be any harm in selecting one of them to e.g. facilitate communication with the wider community,
including ﬁnancial markets, politicians, academics and the general public. On such grounds, one
could select e.g. the system of the vertical Phillips curve for policy analysis instead of the other
two systems: (3) and (4).
However, choosing the system with the vertical Phillips curve, or that of the downward-sloping
one, may seem less obvious in the light of a further examination of their econometric properties.
One may start by examining the validity of employing the FIML method for estimation since it rests
9on speciﬁc assumptions regarding residuals; see e.g. Andreou and Spanos (2003). Any violation of
these assumptions on available data may signal model misspeciﬁcation, such as omitted variables
and/or wrong functional form. It is also of interest to formally test whether the explanatory power
of the three models is comparable to that of the VAR model from which they originate.
Table 2 shows that the evidence is not favourable to the systems of Phillips curves, especially to
that of the vertical Phillips curve, while it does not reject the validity of the system of wage-price
ECMs. For all three systems, and the VAR model from which they originate, the null hypotheses
of normally distributed errors are not rejected by the chi-square distributed test. The correspond-
ing p-values are well above 10%. However, the hypotheses of no residual autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity are strongly rejected for the system with the vertical Phillips curve (5). The F-
distributed tests of autocorrelation (up to order 5) and heteroscedasticity in the column for system
(5) suggest that the two null hypotheses are rejected at even the 1% level of signiﬁcance. This is
not inconsistent with the support for the normally distributed errors, but indicates that misspec-
iﬁcation tests have power in diﬀerent directions. Moreover, the support for normally distributed
errors also supports the validity of these tests as they rely on the normality assumption.
Table 2: Diagnostics for the VAR and the three systems
System VAR (3) (4) (5)
Autocorrelation F 0.71[0.80] 1.12[0.33] 1.41[0.12] 2.17[0.00]∗∗
Heteroscedasticity F 1.08[0.32] 0.88[0.76] 1.32[0.05] 1.82[0.00]∗∗
Normality χ2 2.98[0.56] 6.23[0.18] 0.95[0.92] 3.02[0.55]
Overidentiﬁcation χ2 34.3[0.10] 69.1[0.00]∗∗ 118.8[0.00]∗∗
Notes: The number in square brackets are p-values for the respective statistics,
which are adjusted for degrees of freedom. References:
Autorcorrelation test: Godfrey (1978), Doornik (1996); Heteroscedasticity test: White (1980),
Doornik (1996); Normality test: Doornik and Hansen (1994); and Overidentiﬁcation test:
Anderson and Rubin (1949, 1950) and Sargan (1988, pp 125).
In contrast to the results for system (5), the F−tests do not reject the null hypotheses of no-
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity at the 5% level of signiﬁcance for systems (4) and (3). The
corresponding tests for the VAR model suggest that it constitutes a valid foundation for deriving
the three systems.
We now apply an encompassing test to examine whether the three systems originating from the
VAR model explain the data nearly as well as the VAR model itself; cf. Hendry and Mizon (1993).
This test supplements the impression gained by comparing the standard deviations of the residuals
from the diﬀerent systems in Table 1. Speciﬁcally, we test whether or not the sets of over-identifying
restrictions distinguishing each of the three models from the VAR models are accepted by a chi-
square distributed test. Table 2 shows that the set of (24) over-identifying restrictions specifying
system (4) is strongly rejected; the insigniﬁcance of the misspeciﬁcation tests notwithstanding. As
one may expect, system (5) is also strongly rejected. In contrast, the set of (25) over-identifying
restrictions specifying system (3) is not rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level; the p-value is 10%.
10To test the empirical validity of system (4), and by implication that of system (5), we have
also employed a likelihood-ratio test for the null hypothesis that the equilibrium correction terms
(which appear in system (3)) are insigniﬁcant in system (4). This null hypothesis was strongly
rejected by the test on the full sample and diﬀerent subsamples. On the full sample the test-
statistic was 36.2 (=χ2(2)), with a p-value of 0.00 per cent. On a subsample starting in 1981q1,
the test-statistic was 12.5 (=χ2(2)), with a p-value of 0.2 per cent.
2.4.1 Model selection when data are subject to revisions
Data are often measured with errors and revised frequently and substantially over time; see e.g.
Orphanides and Norden (2002). One can therefore argue that empirical support of a model may
vary across diﬀerent vintages of data and hence should not be a decisive factor when choosing
among models.
However, data revisions and diﬀerent vintages of data are valuable sources of information that
can be used to expose spurious empirical relationships. Genuine long-run relationships between
variables are likely to emerge in diﬀerent vintages of data. Speciﬁcally, cointegrating relationships
are likely to remain intact in the face of typical data revisions, which corresponds to stationary
measurement errors, and hence uncorrelated with integrated variables. Moreover, data revisions
that are uncorrelated with stationary variables may not aﬀect estimates of the slope coeﬃcients,
which determine the impulse responses to shocks and thereby the monetary policy response. In
contrast, spurious long-run and short-run relationships are likely to break down in the face of even
minor data revisions. Moreover, changes in estimated relationships in the face of data revisions
may indicate that relevant variables have been omitted from the estimated relationship. Therefore,
estimation of economic relationships on diﬀerent vintages of data may reveal information about
the adequacy of a model and provide additional evidence on its validity.
A thorough examination of the three systems using diﬀerent vintages of data is beyond the
scope of this study. However, as noted in Section 2.2, the long-run relationships embedded in
the system of wage-price ECMs, (3), have been supported by data of diﬀerent sample lengths
and vintages. Moreover, evidence of the wage-price ECMs encompassing the (two versions) of
the Phillips curve systems, (4)–(5), has been found on diﬀerent sample periods. In particular,
the strong support for the wage-price ECMs relative to the system (4), and hence also relative to
system (5), on the subsample starting in 1981q1 indicates that typical data revisions are unlikely
to overturn the evidence favouring the wage-price ECMs. This is because the change in correlation
structure resulting from the substantial shortening of the sample is larger than what will usually
ensue from a typical data revision.
To summarize Section 2.4, one may say that competing dynamics wage and price equations can
be formulated and estimated in such a way that requirements like a reasonable ﬁt and correctly
11signed coeﬃcients are met. If a model evaluation ends with checking such properties, one might
claim that available data are not suﬃciently informative and do not strongly favour one model
ahead of another, i.e. show little recalcitrance. However, if one extends model assessment and
apply a number of standard misspeciﬁcation tests, whose properties are well known in the relevant
literature, data may be quite recalcitrant, as demonstrated above. Furthermore, data revisions can
be utilized to expose the inadequacy of models and to distinguish between genuine and spurious
empirical relationships between variables. The next section shows that econometric diﬀerences
between models are not merely of academic interest but may bear heavily on (model-based) policy
recommendations.
3 Economic signiﬁcance of model speciﬁcation
This section investigates the monetary policy implications of the three systems in the face of
demand and supply shocks. We start by outlining our approach to modelling monetary policy and
then present the empirical analysis.
3.1 Model dependence of monetary policy
We assume that monetary policy in the face of a shock, directly or indirectly to the inﬂation rate,
primarily aims to ensure that the inﬂation rate becomes close to its target rate at some speciﬁc
target horizon. This horizon is determined in the light of the properties of the shock, and the
monetary policy authority’s concern for output stability, ceteris paribus. Below, we brieﬂy outline
a convenient procedure for characterizing monetary policy using relatively large macroeconometric
models when the central bank has an hierarchy of objectives; see Akram (2006) for details.
To devise an optimal response to an observable shock that occurs at time τ, we assume that a
forward-looking central bank minimizes the following loss function with respect to an interest rate
path iτ, iτ+1, iτ+2,..iτ+H−1, iτ+H, iτ+H+1,...:
L(.) = Vτ(Π) + λVτ(Y ), (6)
subject to the following constraint:
EτΠτ+H ≈ 0. (7)
This constraint implies that the inﬂation rate must move close to its target in H periods; cf. Smets
(2003). Π denotes deviation from the inﬂation target while H represents the policy horizon, i.e.
the number of periods during which the policy interest rate will deviate from its reference/neutral
value and stimulate or cool oﬀ the economy. The target horizon, i.e. the number of periods inﬂation
will deviate from target, will generally be linked and be close to the policy horizon, but the exact
12relationship will be shock- and model-dependent.8 Typically, inﬂation will converge asymptotically
to its target rate. However, we assume that the policy is set such that the target is largely achieved
in period H, i.e. when the policy interest rate is considered converged with its reference value.
Vτ(·) is a variance function conditional on information at time τ. λ indicates the degree of concern
for ﬂuctuations in the output gap, Y .
This constrained optimization approach implies that the central bank do not compromise its
inﬂation-targeting objective. It is willing, however, to trade oﬀ the (conditional) variance of inﬂa-
tion against that of the output gap in accordance with its value of λ, i.e. the relative weight it
put on reducing output ﬂuctuations relative to reducing inﬂation ﬂuctuations. It follows that we
characterize the hierarchical objectives of the central bank by assigning overriding importance to
the mean of the inﬂation rate while its variance is given a relatively lower importance, since the
central bank may trade oﬀ a reduction in the variance of inﬂation for that in the output gap. This
perspective is consistent with what Faust and Henderson (2004) regard as best-practice monetary
policy.9
We envision that in the face of a shock, the central bank derives a set of interest rate paths,
each of them satisfying the constraint (7) for diﬀerent policy horizons Hs. Then, from this set of
interest rate paths, it selects and implements the interest rate path, and the corresponding policy
horizon, that would minimize the loss function (6).
However, there can be numerous interest rate paths that satisfy the constraint (7) for every
possible policy horizons. By only considering interest rate paths that obey some reasonable pattern,
however, the set of relevant interest rate paths can be limited to the number of relevant policy
horizons Hs.
We need to assume that the central bank initiates changes in the interest rate when the shock
occurs at time τ and thereafter allow the interest rate to return gradually towards its reference
value/neutral rate, (i0), as commonly observed in practice; see e.g. Sack and Wieland (2000) and
Qvigstad (2005).10,11 Then, if the model is linear, an interest rate path satisfying the constraint
(7) for a speciﬁc policy horizon H can be obtained from the following interest rate rule:
it = i0 + (1 − %H)
βε
(1 − φ)
ετ + %H(it−1 − i0) ; t = τ, τ + 1, τ + 2,.... (8)
8In several studies including Batinin and Nelson (2001) policy horizon is equated with target horizon, as deﬁned
here.
9Accordingly, “...best-practice policy can be summarized in terms of two goals: First, get mean inﬂation right;
second, get the variance of inﬂation right.”, but “...getting the mean right may be the goal of greatest importance”;
see Faust and Henderson (2004, pp. 117–118).
10It is quite common in the relevant literature to rule out interest rate paths that seem unreasonable. In contrast
to our approach, this is typically obtained by including a measure of volatility in interest rates in the objective
function of the central bank; see e.g. Smets (2003), Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
11By restricting movements of the interest rates, however, one looses some control over the movements of the
inﬂation rate. Consequently, the inﬂation rate can e.g. ﬂuctuate around its target rate before settling down to it
instead of converging with it gradually in a geometric fashion. To make the inﬂation rate e.g. converge gradually
with its target rate, the interest rate may need to move excessively around its reference/neutral rate. This may
seem at odds with facts, though.
13The response coeﬃcient (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ) ≡ βε,H determines how much the interest rate must
change initially to counteract the inﬂationary eﬀects of a shock ετ.12 This initial deviation is
thereafter eliminated gradually, depending on the value of an interest rate smoothing parameter
%H. It appears that both the response coeﬃcient and the degree of smoothing depend on the policy
horizon.13 φ denotes the degree of persistence in the shock and is assumed to be positive and less
than one: 0 ≤ φ < 1. It follows that a persistent shock (for which φ > 0) requires a stronger initial
response (βε,H) than a transitory shock for a given degree of interest rate smoothing (%H) and βε.
The value of βε depends on the shock and the model. It is a derived parameter whose value
increases with the inﬂationary eﬀects of the shock over a speciﬁc period, but declines with the
eﬀectiveness of interest rates in checking inﬂation. It is convenient to estimate βε by taking the
ratio of the accumulated impulse responses of the shock over the simulation horizon to that of a
monetary policy shock.14 βε can be considered a constant (shock- and model-speciﬁc) parameter,
if the transmission mechanism of the shocks is super exogenous with respect to the policy changes
considered; see Engle et al. (1983).
The policy horizon enters the interest rate rule through the interest rate smoothing parameter.
%H is deﬁned as δ1/(H+1) and takes on a value in the range of (0,1) depending on the policy
horizon H (for a given δ). δ is a suﬃciently small ﬁxed parameter of choice that indicates when
the interest rate may be considered converged with its reference value; in principle, the interest
rate will converge asymptotically with its reference value.
The degree of smoothing increases with the policy horizon in a concave fashion. In particular,
H = 0 will lead to (almost) no interest rate smoothing (%H = δ), while large values of H will imply
a high degree of interest rate smoothing since %H = δ1/(H+1) −→ 1 when H −→ ∞. The case
H = 0 refers to the case when the policy-maker only allows interest rates to deviate from their
reference rate in a single period at time τ.
However, the initial response becomes stronger with a short policy horizon than with a relatively
longer policy horizon. The value of the response coeﬃcient βε,H (≡ (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ)) declines
(in a geometric fashion) with the policy horizon or degree of interest rate smoothing. In particular,
(1−%H)βε/(1−φ) ≈ βε/(1−φ) when H = 0, while (1−%H)βε/(1−φ) −→ 0 when H −→ ∞; since
%H −→ 1. This suggests that if a very long policy horizon is allowed, the interest rate needs to
deviate only marginally from its reference value, but this deviation has to persist for a long time.
A long horizon would help subdue the required initial response to a relatively persistent shock.
In particular, if persistence in a shock is matched by persistence in interest rates, i.e. %H = φ, the
initial response becomes equal to βε. In contrast, a short horizon may imply a particularly large
12One may also think of ετ as a vector of shocks at time τ and βε,H as the corresponding vector of response
coeﬃcients.
13This rule resembles a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing except that it is the determinant of (excess)
inﬂation, i.e. ετ, that enters the rule rather than inﬂation itself; see Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
14An implication of such an estimate is that inﬂation targeting can become eﬀectively equal to price-path targeting;
see Akram (2006) for details.
14deviation from the neutral interest rate in the face of a persistent shock.
Clearly, the parameters characterizing the interest rate rule depend on the policy horizon (H),
in a given model and a given i0. By varying H, one can vary the interest rate rule and thus the
complete interest rate path as well as the level of the loss L(.).
It follows that once the rule (8) is implemented in the model, the optimal policy response to a
shock can be found by minimizing the loss function (6) with respect to H. The optimal value of
H will then deﬁne the optimal interest rate change, βε,H∗, the optimal degree of smoothing, %H∗,
as well as the optimal level of loss, L(.), conditional on a given (version of) the macroeconometric
model, M.
We are particularly interested in analyzing the eﬀect of model choice on the loss L(.) and
consequently the policy, represented by the policy horizon (H). We therefore express the loss
function (6) as an explicit function of H and M:
L(.) ≡ L(H,M). (9)
Optimal loss is deﬁned by the optimal policy horizon, H∗, for a given model, M. H∗ will depend
on the degree of concern for ﬂuctuations in the real economy (λ). Thus, βε,H∗ and %H∗, will also
depend on λ.
3.2 Monetary policy implications of the models
We investigate diﬀerences in economic and policy implications of the three alternative wage and
price systems in response to demand and supply shocks. To this end, we embed them, in turn, in
a macroeconometric model of Norway. This way we are able to almost close the wage and price
system. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the three versions of the macroeconometric model,
which would diﬀer from each other only by the wage and price system included, as ‘ECM’, ‘PCM’
and ‘PCMr’, respectively. Speciﬁcally, ECM includes the system of wage-price ECMs, (3); PCM
includes the system of Phillips curves (4) while PCMr includes the system with the vertical Phillips
curve (5), which is a restricted version of (4).
The diﬀerence between the three versions of the macroeconometric model essentially consists
of diﬀerence in restrictions on the overall equilibrium correction behaviour. The version with the
wage-price ECMs has more equilibrium correction mechanisms than the version with the downward-
sloping Phillips curve; which in turn is more equilibrium correcting than the version with a vertical
Phillips curve system. In the following, we brieﬂy present the macroeconometric model and further
details about the analysis before presenting our main results.
153.2.1 Macroeconometric model
The macroeconometric model is a version of the model developed in B˚ ardsen et al. (2003, 2005)
which has been documented and employed in several studies, including Akram et al. (2006). The
model is (log) linear and estimated on quarterly aggregate data for the period 1972–2001. In
addition to a system of wages and prices, the model contains equations for aggregate demand,
unemployment, import prices, labour productivity, credit demand, and three asset prices: house
prices, domestic equity prices and the nominal exchange rate. Foreign variables and domestic
government expenditures and electricity prices are treated as exogenous variables.
In particular, short-run ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand are determined by the real exchange
rate, real interest rate and wealth eﬀects from house prices and equity prices. Thus, a change
in consumer prices aﬀects aggregate demand through its eﬀect on the real exchange rate and the
(ex-post) real interest rate. However, an increase in domestic prices mainly depresses aggregate
demand because of the dominating eﬀect of the real exchange rate appreciation that follows. The
unemployment rate follows growth in output in the short run, as in an Okun’s law relationship.
In addition, it exhibits reversion towards its equilibrium rate over time.
Monetary policy, represented by short-term interest rates, has direct eﬀects on the asset prices,
credit and aggregate demand, but is neutral in the long run. The model may be considered a
backward-looking model in the sense that it does not make the expectations formation processes
explicit. The whole model may be considered econometrically well-speciﬁed, when system (3) is
included, with apparently invariant parameters with respect to changes in monetary policy over
the sample; see B˚ ardsen et al. (2003, 2005) for documentation. The lack of evidence for signiﬁcant
parameter instability in the face of shifts in monetary policy is in line with Ericsson and Irons
(1995) and Rudebusch (2005). In the following, we assume that the model will remain invariant
to the monetary policy decisions we consider.
3.2.2 Demand and supply shocks
The monetary policy response to a shock is characterized by rule (8), where the response coeﬃcient
(βε) is entirely model- and shock-dependent. We derive the (absolute) value of the response
coeﬃcient in response to a shock for a given model by taking the ratio of the accumulated impulse
responses of the shock to that of a monetary policy shock; see Akram (2006) for details. The
impulse responses of the two shocks are accumulated over a simulation horizon of six years, when
eﬀects of the shocks (approximately) die out.15
In details, to derive the value of the response coeﬃcient in the face of a transitory demand shock
(d), βd, conditional on a version of the macroeconometric model, we temporarily raise the residual
in the aggregate demand equation such that growth in aggregate demand initially increases by
15The results are invariant to the choice of the simulation period since the model is linear.
16one percentage point over a year, and record the implied impulse response of inﬂation over time.
Thereafter, we raise the short-term interest rate over a year by one percentage point and record
its eﬀects on inﬂation over time. The ratio of the accumulated impulse responses of the demand
shock to that of the monetary policy shock leads to the estimate of the response coeﬃcient βd.
Similarly, to derive the values of the response coeﬃcients in the face of a supply shock for the three
model versions, we raise the residual in their (consumer) price equations such that price inﬂation
increases by one percentage point over a year. The response coeﬃcient in face of the supply shock
(s), βs, implied by a given model is then derived as the ratio of the accumulated impulse response
of inﬂation to the supply shock to that of the interest rate shock.
Values of %H for diﬀerent policy horizons are obtained from %H = δ1/(H+1), where we set δ to
say 0.1 to deﬁne convergence. That is, we would consider an interest rate deviation (of e.g. one
percentage point) from the reference rate converged with the reference rate when it deviates not
more than 1/10 of the initial deviation from the reference rate. Alternative values of δ do not bring
about substantially diﬀerent results.
Estimates of the horizon-speciﬁc response coeﬃcients βε,H for a given model and shock can be
obtained from the formula: (1−%H)βε/(1−φ), for diﬀerent degrees of persistence in the shock and
interest rates, φ and %H, respectively. Obviously, %H and thus βε,H vary with the policy horizon.
The left and the middle frames of Figure 2 display values of the response coeﬃcient for the
(transitory, φ = 0) demand shock and the supply shock, respectively, associated with the three
model versions: ECM, PCM and PCMr. The values of the response coeﬃcients are presented for
diﬀerent policy horizons in the range 0–12 quarters. The right frame of Figure 2 depicts the degree
of interest rate smoothing %H implied by the diﬀerent policy horizons. Before analyzing the results
for each of the two shocks, we make the following general observations.
First, an increase in the policy horizon reduces the required initial interest rate response to a
shock, but raises the degree of interest rate smoothing, ceteris paribus; see Figure 2. For example,
the required initial interest rate response declines substantially if the policy horizon is increased
from 0 to 8 quarters. This must, however, be accompanied by an increase in interest rate smoothing,
%H, from 0.1 to 0.77 (right frame). And second, an increase in the policy horizon from a low level
leads to a larger reduction in the response coeﬃcient than an increase in the policy horizon from
a relatively high level. This is due to the concave relationship between the degree of interest rate
smoothing and the policy horizon, since %H = δ1/(H+1), which in turn leads to a convex relationship
of geometric form between the response coeﬃcient and the policy horizon. A linear relationship
between the degree of interest rate smoothing and the policy horizon would have implied a linear
relationship between the response coeﬃcient and the policy horizon. However, the results presented
would not have changed qualitatively.
































Figure 2: Left: Initial interest rate responses to the demand shock (in percentage points) implied
by diﬀerent policy horizons (horizontal axes), βd,H. They are suggested by the three versions of
the macroeconometric model: ECM, PCM and PCMr. Middle: Initial interest rate responses to
the supply shock implied by diﬀerent policy horizons, βs,H, suggested by the three model versions.
Right: Interest rate smoothing, %H, associated with diﬀerent policy horizons (horizontal axes).
3.2.3 Economic and monetary policy implications
Figure 2 shows that both PCM and PCMr suggest a stronger response to both shocks than ECM,
at all horizons. In particular, PCMr suggests a stronger response to both shocks than PCM and
ECM. However, Figure 2 reveals substantial diﬀerences between the monetary policy response to
the two shocks across the three model versions.
In the case of the demand shock, the interest rate response is relatively low varying in the range
of 0.25–1.75 percentage points across the three models. The diﬀerences across the three models
are relatively small. This reﬂects that the interplay of the wage and price system with the rest of
the model, particularly with aggregate demand and unemployment, is not that diﬀerent across the
three wage and price systems. A demand shock has relatively larger inﬂationary eﬀects, while a
monetary policy shock has relatively stronger deﬂationary eﬀects in PCM and especially in PCMr,
relative to ECM. This is also reﬂected in the response coeﬃcients, but to a smaller extent since
the ratio of the accumulated inﬂationary eﬀects to that of the deﬂationary eﬀects is aﬀected to a
smaller extent.
Figure 3 sets out the economic performance of the policies in the face of the demand shock
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Figure 3: Economic performance and optimal policy suggested by three models in the face of the
demand shock. Left column: Trade-oﬀs between standard deviations of inﬂation gap and output gap
(horizontal axis) associated with diﬀerent (policy) horizon-speciﬁc rules in response to the demand
shock. The trade-oﬀs are plotted for rules associated with policy horizons (H) in the range of 0–12
quarters. Here and elsewhere, the trade-oﬀs associated with diﬀerent horizons follow each other,
where that one for H=0 is indicated. Right column: Values of the relative loss function (in %),
deﬁned by equation (10), at the diﬀerent policy horizons (horizontal axis).
is measured by the standard deviations of the output gap and inﬂation. A policy horizon fully
describes the interest rate rule for given values of the response coeﬃcient, βd; see Section 3.1.
Hence, the optimal policy is found by minimizing the loss function (6) with respect to the policy
horizon. We assume that the parameter reﬂecting concern for output gap ﬂuctuations, λ, is equal
to 0.5. We present values of the loss functions under diﬀerent policy horizons relative to their value
under the optimal policy horizon (H∗) for a given model version (M).
We deﬁne the relative loss, ∆L(H;M), as:
∆L(H;M) ≡
L(H;M) − L(H∗; M)
L(H∗;M)
. (10)
Here, L(H;M) denotes the level of loss by choosing H conditional on a speciﬁc model (version)
M, while L(H∗;M) expresses the loss under optimal policy horizon conditional on model M. It
follows that ∆L(H;M) > 0 for H 6= H∗ while ∆L(H;M) = 0 when H = H∗, when the loss
function is continuous in H and there is a unique optimum.
As expected, there is no conﬂict between the objectives of price stabilization and output stabi-
lization in the case of the demand shock; see Figure 3, left column. Moreover, it appears that both
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Figure 4: Interest rate paths over time suggested by three models in the face of the supply shock.
The three frames shows interest rate paths associated with the policy horizons of 3, 6 and 12
quarters, respectively. The interest rates are measured as deviation from the reference interest rate
in percentage points, while the horizontal axes depict periods in quarters.
objectives can be promoted by reducing the policy horizon as much as possible. Hence, a policy
horizon of zero appears as the most eﬃcient one. The values of the relative loss functions are zero,
i.e. at their optimal level, for H= 0; see right column. Hence, the optimal policy horizon would
be zero irrespective of which wage and price system we implement in the model. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the bulk of studies suggesting that demand shocks should be counteracted as
aggressively as possible, since inﬂation can be stabilized jointly with output.
In the case of the supply shock, however, the implied monetary policy response is much stronger
and diﬀers widely across the three models; see Figure 2, middle frame. Figure 4 depicts the interest
rate paths implied by the three models for three diﬀerent policy horizons: 3, 6 and 12 quarters.
These paths exhibit clearly the diﬀerences in monetary policy response implied by the three models.
Moreover, the gap in policy implications of PCM and PCMr is wider than the gap between those
of PCMr and ECM. Notably, if there was an exogenously provided ﬁxed policy horizon, the three
wage and price systems, particularly the two systems of Phillips curves, would have suggested
substantially diﬀerent monetary policy responses to the supply shock. Hence, one may say that
seemingly minor parameter restrictions can alter the policy implications of a model fundamentally.
The large diﬀerences in the response coeﬃcients across the three models can be ascribed to
the associated wage and price systems, speciﬁcally to diﬀerences in the autoregressive coeﬃcients
20across the three systems and to the eﬀect of the unemployment term. The autoregressive coeﬃcients
largely determine the degree of persistence in the inﬂationary eﬀects of the supply shock, i.e. how
fast the inﬂationary eﬀects of the transitory supply shock are exhausted. The larger the persistence,
the more lasting the inﬂationary eﬀects and the stronger the required interest rate response will be.
The relatively weak eﬀect of unemployment on the wage growth in system (5), relative to those in
systems (3) and (4), the monetary policy becomes less eﬀective in PCMr, than in ECM and PCM.
Hence, a relatively larger change in the interest rate is required in the case of PCMr than in the
cases of ECM and PCM.
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Figure 5: Initial interest rate response suggested by ECM to supply shocks with diﬀerent degrees of
persistence, φ. The initial interest rate response is implied by policy horizons in the range 0–12
quarters (horizontal axis).
For example, the degree of persistence implied by the lagged and contemporaneous terms of
wages and prices in system (5) is higher than that implied by system (4), which in itself implies
higher persistence than system (3). Consequently, the inﬂationary eﬀects of the transitory supply
shock are more lasting in the case of PCMr than in the case of PCM, which in itself implies more
lasting eﬀects than ECM. Accordingly, the required interest rate response is higher in the case of
PCMr than in the case of PCM and relatively low in the case of ECM.
The systems of Phillips curves, (4) and (5), which have relatively stronger autoregressive eﬀects
than the system of wage-price ECMs, (3), eﬀectively make the transitory supply shock a more
persistent one than the system of ECMs. In the system of ECMs, a certain degree of persistence
is modelled by lagged wage and price growth variables and equilibrium correction terms in the
levels of variables. In terms of a VAR in levels, this entails that some of the characteristic roots
are on the unit circle, while others are on the stable side of the unit circle. The system of the
downward-sloping Phillips curve (4), however, implies a reduction in the number of stable roots
21since the direct equilibrium correction in wage and price setting is omitted, and as a consequence,
an increase in the degree of persistence of any shock. The system of vertical Phillips curve system
(5), has even more in-built persistence, because extra unit-roots are implied by the homogeneity
restrictions; cf. B˚ ardsen and Nymoen (2006).
The analytical expression for the required interest rate response suggests that an increase in
the degree of persistence in a shock increases the required interest rate response; see equation
(8). Figure 5 suggests that the required interest rate responses in the case of ECM can become
comparable to those implied by PCM and PCMr if we raise the persistence in the supply shock.
Figure 6 presents the economic performance of (optimal and suboptimal) policies employed
in response to the supply shock. The left column of the ﬁgure shows that there is a trade-oﬀ
between price and output stabilization for diﬀerent ranges of policy horizons. Speciﬁcally, in the
case of ECM and PCM there is a trade-oﬀ in the range of 0 to 8 quarters. Policy horizons that are
longer than 8 quarters appear ineﬃcient as both price and output stabilization can be improved by
shortening the policy horizon. The opposite is the case for PCMr. In this case, the trade-oﬀ curve
is associated with policy horizons that are longer than 6 quarters, while policy horizons shorter
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Figure 6: Economic performance and optimal policy suggested by three models in the face of the
supply shock. Left column: Trade-oﬀs between standard deviations of inﬂation gap and output gap
(horizontal axis) associated with diﬀerent (policy) horizon-speciﬁc rules in response to the supply
shock. The trade-oﬀs are plotted for rules associated with policy horizons (H) in the range of 0–12
quarter, where that for H = 0 is indicated. Right column: Values of the relative loss function (in
%), deﬁned by equation (10), at the diﬀerent policy horizons (horizontal axis).
22Figure 6 shows, in right column, that the three models recommend substantially diﬀerent policy
horizons. Even though the eﬃciency frontiers for ECM and PCM are deﬁned by almost the same
policy horizon, the optimal horizon is 3 quarters conditional on ECM, but 6 quarters in the case of
PCM. In the case of PCMr the policy horizon is 11 quarters. (An increase in the value of λ from
0.5 would have increased the optimal policy horizons in all three models.)
The largely diﬀerent optimal policy horizons imply widely diﬀerent interest rate paths. They
can be seen from Figure 4, where the interest rate path favoured by ECM appears in the left frame,
that by PCM in the middle frame, while that favoured by PCMr would be comparable to that for
H= 12 in the right frame. Both ECM and PCM suggest about the same initial interest rate increase
for H = 3 and H = 6, respectively; 2.25 and 2.5. However, the degree of interest rate smoothing
associated with H = 6 is relatively higher, i.e. 0.72, which makes monetary policy contractionary
over a relatively longer period than when H= 3. PCMr suggests an initial interest rate increase
of about 4 for H= 11, while the implied interest rate smoothing is 0.83. Hence, PCMr suggests a
more aggressive as well as a more prolonged contractionary monetary policy stance than the other
two models.
In sum, the more persistent the inﬂationary eﬀects are in a model, the longer is the preferred
policy horizon. Both a higher degree of persistence in the inﬂationary eﬀects of the shocks and
the implied policy response, which increases with the degree of persistence, contribute to relatively
large economic ﬂuctuations, i.e. high standard deviation of prices and the output gap. This is
especially the case at especially short policy horizons. A relatively long horizon leads to a less
aggressive policy response and a more prolonged contractionary policy. This helps to achieve a
better synchronization between the destabilizing eﬀect of the persistent inﬂationary eﬀects with the
stabilizing eﬀect of monetary policy. Monetary policy thereby becomes more eﬀective in stabilizing
the economy.
The above results underscore the importance of imposing valid coeﬃcient estimates when con-
ducting monetary policy analysis. As demonstrated, restrictions on parameter values can have a
more profound eﬀect on monetary policy than alterations in model speciﬁcation. The diﬀerences
in suggested policy horizons can be mainly ascribed to the alteration in the degree of persistence
by the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and to the estimates of unemployment on wages. Figure 7
shows that ECM would have produced similar results if the shock had been more persistent. For
example, if the persistence in the shock had been 0.3, ECM would have suggested an optimal policy
horizon of 6 quarters, and of 12 quarters if the persistence had been 0.5. It follows that imposing
seemingly weak restrictions to make the model e.g. more presentable may not be an innocuous
act.
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Figure 7: Relative losses at diﬀerent policy horizons, 0–12, when monetary policy responds to
supply shocks with diﬀerent degrees of persistence. The relative losses (in %), deﬁned by (10), are
based on ECM.
4 Costs of an invalid model and robust policies
In the following we investigate potential costs of selecting an invalid model for policy analysis or
of basing policy on a suite of models. It is shown that such costs can be substantial, even when
robust policies are adopted.
4.1 Costs when an invalid model is selected
Let us suppose that we choose to implement a monetary policy rule that is optimal in one of the
models considered. We might have selected this rule because our analysis could have suggested
that this policy rule is the most robust rule, i.e. it will perform better than any of the other rules
if the valid model turns out to be diﬀerent than the one implying the rule; cf. Hansen and Sargent
(2001). An invalid model and the implied policy rule may also be adopted (unknowingly) if e.g.
criteria such as transparency and parsimony of a model are emphasized at the expense of a model’s
data consistency.
Figure 8 examines the potential costs of choosing rules that are optimal in PCM and in PCMr
in response to the supply shock when ECM is by assumption the valid model; the former rules are
referred to as the PCM-rule and the PCMr-rule, respectively.16 The upper frame of Figure 8 depicts
the outcomes in terms of standard deviations of inﬂation and the output gap when the PCM-rule
and PCMr-rule are implemented in ECM. For comparison, the outcomes under (suboptimal and
optimal) rules based on ECM itself, referred to as ECM-rules, are also plotted. The lower frame of
16For the sake of brevity, we do not present results for the cases where PCM and in PCMr are assumed to be valid
models.
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Figure 8: Economic performance and relative losses (in %) under diﬀerent rules in response to
the supply shock when ECM is the valid model. In the upper column, we plot outcomes in terms
of standard deviations of the inﬂation gap (vertical axis) and output gap conditional on rules that
would have been optimal if PCM or PCMr was the valid model. For comparison, we also reproduce
the outcomes associated with (policy) horizon-speciﬁc rules based on ECM itself; cf. Figure 6. The
policy horizon is varied in the range of 0-14; thus outcomes under 15 rules based on the valid
model itself are reported. In the lower frame, we report values of the relative loss function (in %)
under the optimal rules assuming the validity of PCM and PCMr. The relative losses are calculated
relative to the optimal loss if the optimal rule based on ECM itself was implemented; cf. (11) for a
deﬁnition. The lower frame also reproduces values of the relative loss for diﬀerent policy horizons
under ECM itself; cf. Figure 6.
the ﬁgure presents the relative losses under the ECM-rules as well as under the (optimal) PCM-
rule and PCMr-rule. The losses are measured relative to the level under the optimal ECM-rule:






where L(PCMr-rule; ECM) expresses that the value of the loss function (6) has been obtained by
implementing the rule that is optimal in PCMr, in ECM. As shown above, H∗ = 11 deﬁnes the
optimal rule conditional on PCMr, while H∗ = 3 deﬁnes the optimal rule conditional on ECM. As
above, we calculate the losses assuming λ = 0.5; cf. equation (10).
Figure 8 shows that if ECM is the valid model, while the policy rules are based on PCM and
PCMr, both inﬂation and the output gap will become relatively more unstable, especially if the
PCMr-rule is implemented. We note that under the PCM-rule, the loss would be 46% higher
25relative to that under the optimal ECM-rule. Under the vertical PCM-rule, however, the relative
loss would be much higher: 228%.
It also seems that choosing the valid model and the corresponding rule is much more important
than choosing the optimal policy horizon, and thereby the corresponding interest rate path. The
lower frame of the ﬁgure shows that the relative losses under both the PCM-rule and particularly
under the PCMr-rule are higher than under rules that are based on ECM but are deﬁned by policy
horizons that diﬀer from the optimal policy horizon, 3. It can be shown that, at least for policy
horizons within the range of 0–20 quarters, the relative loss under such rules never exceeds 42%,
which is for H= 0.
Even if we follow the Brainard principle, the loss owing to the model being invalid would
be considerable. For example, if the PCMr-rule was a suboptimal rule deﬁned by e.g. H= 20
quarters, rather than 11 quarters, while conditioning on PCMr, and the PCM-rule was a suboptimal
rule deﬁned by H= 8 quarters conditioning on PCM, costs owing to implementing them in ECM
would have been lower, but still considerable. The relative loss would be 157% under the PCMr-
rule deﬁned by H= 20 and 37% under the PCM-rule deﬁned by H= 8 . By choosing 20 and 8
quarters, instead of 11 and 6, respectively, one chooses a relatively longer horizon, higher degree
of smoothing, and accordingly a weaker initial response.17 In addition to costs captured by the
relative loss function, there could be possible additional costs in the form of credibility loss owing
to inﬂation not being close to the target at the policy horizons preferred by invalid models.
4.2 Costs when policy is based on a suite of models
We now assume that the economy is adequately characterized by one of the three models considered.
However, we do not distinguish between the models and consider them equally probable, and hence
also the associated monetary policy rules as equally relevant. Therefore, instead of implementing
one speciﬁc monetary policy rule in the face of a given shock, we implement an ‘average-rule’.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the required interest rate response, βs, in the rule (8) as 1/3 of the sum of
the βss implied by the three models and then determine the response for diﬀerent horizons by (8),
as above, for a transitory shock φ = 0. This is consistent with a Bayesian approach to formulating
a robust policy in the face of model uncertainty.
Figure 9 presents the outcome of the average-rule if the economy is actually characterized by
ECM. For comparison, we also present the performance under the ”valid rule”, i.e. the rule implied
by ECM. The upper frame depicts the curves presenting the trade-oﬀ between stability in inﬂation
and output gap, while the lower frame depicts the loss under both rules relative to the loss under
the optimal ECM-rule, deﬁned in Section 4.1.
17The policy horizon of 20 and 8 would be the optimal horizons in the hypothetical case where we had to derive
the initial interest rate responses using PCMr and PCM, respectively, and implement the resulting rules in ECM.
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Figure 9: Economic performance and relative losses (in %) under the ‘average-rule’ in response to
the supply shock when ECM is the valid model. In the upper column, we plot outcomes in terms of
standard deviations of the inﬂation gap (vertical axis) and output gap conditional on the average-
rule for diﬀerent policy horizons (horizontal axis). For comparison, we also reproduce the outcomes
associated with (policy) horizon-speciﬁc rules based on ECM itself; cf. Figure 6. The policy horizon
is varied in the range of 0–14; thus outcomes under 15 rules based on the average-rule as well as
ECM itself are reported. In the lower frame, we report values of the relative loss function under
the average- rule as well as the ECM itself. The relative losses are calculated relative to the loss if
the optimal rule based on ECM itself was implemented; cf. equation (11) for a deﬁnition.
It appears that an average-rule will lead to much higher variation in both inﬂation and the
output gap than under an ECM-rule, irrespective of the policy horizon; in the ﬁgure this is shown
only for policy horizons in the range of 0–14 quarters. Under average-rules, which can be deﬁned by
diﬀerent policy horizons, there is a trade-oﬀ between price and output stability for policy horizons
above 4 quarters. The poor performance of average-rules is mainly because they suggest a much
stronger policy response than favoured by the valid model, by assumption, ECM. Relatively short
policy horizons under an average-rule are especially destabilizing because they suggest relatively
strong immediate interest rate hikes; cf. Figure 2. A comparison of the trade oﬀ curves in Figure 9
suggests that the performance of an average-rule will be considered inferior to that of an ECM-rule,
irrespective of preferences for output stabilization.
The lower frame of Figure 9 shows relative values of the loss function under both (suboptimal
and optimal) ECM-rules and average-rules. The diﬀerence between relative losses indicates the
costs of implementing the average-rule relative to that of implementing ECM-rules. It appears
that the loss will be higher, the lower is the policy horizon under an average-rule. Notably, if
27we implement an average-rule, the loss when ECM is valid will tend to decrease with the policy
horizon. Thus, even though we choose the policy horizon for which the loss under an average-rule
will be at a minimum, which is at H= 13, the relative loss under the average-rule will be ca. 63%
higher than that under the optimal ECM-rule, deﬁned by H= 3. In addition, it must be borne in
mind that if an average-rule consistent with one’s preferences is implemented, by choosing one of
the policy horizons considered, it will generally make inﬂation deviate from its target rate. Also,
possible costs of basing policy on a suite of models may become higher if the suite does not include
the valid model.
As observed above, it also seems more important to choose the rule consistent with the valid
model than choosing the optimal policy horizon. We note that under an ECM-rule deﬁned by H6=
H∗ = 3, the relative loss does not exceed that under an average-rule even when the relative loss
under an average-rule is at its minimum, i.e. when H= 13.
5 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the importance of selecting the valid model for monetary policy analysis.
A model can be selected on the basis of several desirable model properties, including how well a
model’s properties and functioning can be communicated to a wider audience and the robustness
of a model’s policy implications to potential deﬁciencies of a model. Model choice may involve
trading oﬀ one set of desirable properties with another. However, our empirical analysis suggests
that letting an empirically invalid model inﬂuence monetary policy can lead to policy mistakes that
may have substantial costs. Hence, the analysis suggests that a model for policy analysis should
necessarily be empirically valid and calls for caution when compromising this property for other
desirable model properties, including robustness.18
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on three alternative econometric systems for wage
and price inﬂation for Norway that have been embedded as the supply side in a macroeconometric
model for medium-term analyses. We have undertaken an extensive econometric evaluation of
the three systems to check their congruency with available data. It has been shown that such an
evaluation can enable one to choose a model that is more likely to present a valid characterization
of the economy under study than models that appear at odds with available evidence. We have
also argued that data revisions should not be considered a nuisance, but sources of information
that can be utilized to expose the inadequacy of models and to distinguish between genuine and
spurious empirical relationships between variables.
We ﬁnd that econometric diﬀerences bear heavily on (model-based) policy recommendations
and are thus not merely of academic interest. First, our empirical analysis suggests that diﬀerences
18This is consistent with e.g. Granger (1992) who states that “...it should be generally agreed that a model that
does not generate many properties of actual data cannot be claimed to have any ’policy implications’...”.
28in model speciﬁcations and even in parameter values across models can lead to widely diﬀerent
policy implications. Interestingly, it appears that imposing a set of parameter restrictions may have
stronger inﬂuence on policy implications than choosing a diﬀerent functional form of the model.
And second, monetary policy based on a model that turns out to be an invalid characterization of
the economy under study may lead to substantial losses in terms of economic performance, even
when policy is guided by gradualism in line with the Brainard principle. Moreover, basing policy
on a suite of models can also lead to relatively large losses, even when the suite of models contains
the valid model by assumption. Actually, possible losses from basing policy on such practice appear
greater than possible losses from choosing a suboptimal policy horizon and the associated interest
rate path in the face of a shock.
Estimates can always be contested in economics. Thus, further research using alternative
models and alternative ways of characterizing monetary policy would be useful in assessing the
robustness of our results. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that there may be huge
gains from utilizing empirical evidence eﬃciently to select the valid model and parameter estimates.
In this endeavour, there may also be large gains from improving data quality and timely availability
of data as well as further research on improving tools for the eﬃcient use of available information.
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A Data deﬁnitions
A.1 Notes
1. Unless another source is given, the time series have been extracted from databases maintained
by Norges Bank (The central bank of Norway).
2. The variables are precisely deﬁned in Rikmodnotat 140, Norges Bank, Research department,
19th April 1999. The variables are named as indicated in hard brackets [.] below.
3. Several of the variables refer to the mainland economy, deﬁned as the total economy excluding
oil and gas production and international shipping.
4. In the main text, impulse dummies are denoted iyyqx, where yy gives the year with two
digits and x contains the quarter (1, 2, 3). Hence i80q2 is 1 in the second quarter of 1980
and 0 in all other quarters.
32A.2 Deﬁnitions
gap Output gap deﬁned as log mainland GDP (log of the variable Y as deﬁned below) deviations
from trend, where the trend is estimated by the HP-ﬁlter using λ = 1600. Fixed base year
(1991) prices. Mill. NOK.
H Normal working hours per week. [NH]
P Consumer price index. 1991 = 1. [CPI].
PI Deﬂator of total imports. 1991 = 1. [PB].
Y Total value added at market prices in the mainland economy. Fixed base year (1991) prices.
Mill. NOK. [YF].
PR Mainland economy value added per man-hour at factor costs, ﬁxed base year (1991) prices.
Mill. NOK. [ZYF].
RS 3 month Euro-krone interest rate. [RS].
τ1 Employers’ tax rate. τ1 = WCF/WF − 1.
τ3 Indirect tax rate. [T3].
U Rate of unemployment. Registered unemployed plus persons on active labour market pro-
grammes as a percentage of the labour force, calculated as employed wage-earners plus un-
employment. [UTOT].
W Nominal mainland hourly wages. Constructed from time series in the database as:
W = WIBA × TWIBA + WOTV J × (TWTV + TWO + TWJ))/TWF
Wdum Composite dummy for wage freeze: 1 in 1979q1, 1979q2, 1988q2 and 1988q3.
Pdum Composite dummy for introduction and removed of direct price regulations. 1 in 1971q1,
1971q2, 1976q4, 1979q1, -1 in 1975q1, 1980q1, 1981q1, 1982q1. Zero otherwise.
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